المركز الأفريقي للاستشارات African Center for Consultancy

By Ambassador Abdelmahmoud Abdelhalim Signs of tension between the center and the taqray region have been evident since the decline of the region`s influence in the governing institutions following the departure of Meles Zenawi in 2012, as differences gradually began to appear in public during the period of his successor Haile Mariam Dessalines, head of the southern Ethiopian people`s alliance. During that period, the Oromo people, who make up about 40 percent of the country`s population, protested against the granting of land to investors they believe they deserve south of Addis Ababa. These developments led to the resignation of Dessalines, to highlight the name of Abiy Ahmed, a former colonel in the intelligence of the Ethiopian army, after he was chosen by the Oromo Liberation Front as its representative, and later won the confidence of the Central Council of the Ethiopian revolutionary Peoples Alliance on the second of April 2018, beating the taqrai candidate shifero shigot, after being supported by the Amhara alliance, thus beginning a new phase of the conflict between the center and the taqrai front. Despite the announcement of Abu Ahmed in 2018 as the year of national reconciliation, the release of tens of thousands of political prisoners who were described as victims of the rule of taqrai, the abolition of the state of emergency, and the lifting of the status of “terrorism” on some political fronts, he dealt a decisive blow to the interests of taqrai by making fundamental changes in the positions of Chief of staff and director of intelligence, two positions that have remained exclusive to the Sons of taqrai since the coalition took office in 1991. It was difficult for the taqrais, due to the history of their strained relationship with the Eritrean people`s Liberation Front, to accept Abiy Ahmed`s reconciliation with Asmara, his renunciation of the town of Badme in accordance with the judgment of the International Court of justice and the Algiers Agreement, in addition to ending the activity opposing the Ethiopian government that was taking place from inside Eritrean territory, and the return of the leader of the “qanbut Sabat” movement Berhanu Nega and a number of his fighters and allies to the country. Abiy Ahmed`s quest to dissolve the Ethiopian alliance and the establishment of the “prosperity” party was also a central point of disagreement with the takrai front, which saw this trend as an effort to weaken the ethnic federalism established by Meles Zenawi, while Ahmed considered it a necessary step to consolidate the centralized state and strengthen the unity of the country. The spark of war The postponement of the elections and the extension of the parliamentary term for Abu Ahmed came as a shock to the taqrai front, which considered the measure unconstitutional, so the speaker of Parliament Soraya Ibrahim announced her resignation and her return to Makli. The region responded by organizing local elections in which 2.7 million voters participated, which the central government refused to supervise and promised were illegal, while the region responded by not recognizing the central government. Events accelerated after Addis Ababa stopped financial transfers from the territory of taqrai in September 2020, the territory considered it a declaration of war, and requested the intervention of the international community, while the central government described the situation as a "rebellion". On the second of November, military operations between the two parties began, and the country entered a phase of the devastating war that lasted two years, which witnessed close coordination between Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki to deliver a decisive blow to the taqray front. The war left more than four hundred thousand dead, about six hundred thousand displaced, during which serious human rights violations were committed, described by the federal government as a "law enforcement campaign". Pretoria agreement The peace agreement between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF was signed on the second of November 2022 in the city of Pretoria in South Africa, and entered into force on the third of it. The agreement was called the "permanent peace agreement through a permanent cessation of hostilities between the government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the people`s Liberation Front of Tigray". The joint statement of the parties confirmed that the agreement ended two years of war and established a permanent ceasefire, while President Obasanjo, Chairman of the African Union mediation team, explained that the agreement includes “organized and coordinated disarmament”. It was signed on behalf of the Ethiopian government by national security adviser Rizwan Hussein, and on behalf of the Tigray People`s Liberation Front by its spokesman getasho Reza, in the presence of mediators: Musa Faki, chairman of the African Union Commission, Uhuru Kenyatta, former Kenyan president, Phumzile Mlambo Ngoka, former South African vice president, and US envoy Mike Hammer. The agreement included an introduction and fifteen articles that dealt with the governing goals and principles, a permanent cessation of hostilities, the protection of civilians, ensuring humanitarian access, Disarmament, Demobilization and reintegration, confidence-building measures, the restoration of federal authority in the territory of Al-taqray, transitional arrangements, and joint control and monitoring mechanisms. The introductory paragraphs affirmed the commitment to resolving conflicts within the framework of the Constitution, and the African Union`s agenda aimed at “silencing the voice of guns” by 2030, and consolidating the principle of “African solutions to African problems”, leading to a peaceful and lasting settlement that guarantees respect for the sovereignty and unity of the country. The first article stipulated the renunciation of violence as a means of resolving political differences, ensuring security for all, and promoting economic and social interests. The second article affirmed respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ethiopia, the legitimacy of the Constitution, and the protection of human rights. In the third article, the parties announced a comprehensive and immediate ceasefire, which included preventing the laying of mines or targeting by third parties, and all forms of violence and hate speech. Article IV also stipulates the Prohibition of violence based on gender or color, and the obligation of international humanitarian law. Article V guaranteed humanitarian aid to those who were entitled to it, while Article VI stipulated that Ethiopia has a unified national army, and that a plan for the gradual disarmament of the Tirai forces should be implemented within thirty days of the signing. Article VII also stipulated confidence-building measures, and called on the front to respect the Constitution and federal institutions, and avoid cooperation with any hostile armed groups, while the government committed to stop prosecutions, restore services and lift the status of “terrorism” from the front. Subsequent articles dealt with arrangements for the restoration of federal authority to the territory, the establishment of an interim administration, the establishment of a joint African Control and verification mechanism, and confirmation of implementation in good faith. Three years after the agreement With the advent of the second of November 2025, the Pretoria agreement enters its third year, raising questions about its success in achieving internal peace and national stability, and whether it has addressed the roots of the crisis or spawned new challenges. The war of the center and the region of taqrai was one of the bloodiest and most turbulent stations of Ethiopian history, in a country where Wars, tensions and famines continued to accompany his political career, despite his regional status and demographic and political weight. Since the imperial era, when Haile Selassie annexed Eritrea in 1962 to strengthen Ethiopia`s naval and political power, the relationship between the two countries has been a constant source of strain for the Ethiopian state. When Eritrea gained independence on May 24, 1993, it was hoped that the two countries would establish mutual cooperation, but the legacy of the historical conflict prevented this, and a new war broke out between them in 1998-2000. Abiy Ahmed was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 in recognition of his efforts to end the war with Eritrea, and for achieving a political breakthrough that seemed promising, but relations between the two countries declined again after the signing of the Pretoria agreement, which restored the TPLF`s political status and abolished the “terrorism”status. An atmosphere of suspicion and anticipation has become prevalent between Addis Ababa and Asmara, whose hopes for continued pressure on the taqrai front have faded. As the agreement enters its third year, its repercussions continue to cast a shadow, leaving behind victims and grievances that are feared to lead to renewed conflict. One of the most notable results of the agreement is the disintegration of the TPLF itself, after sharp divisions within its ranks between the wing of its chairman Debrecen kabrimichael, and the former Speaker Getachew Reza, who signed the agreement and assumed the presidency of the interim administration before being replaced by Tadesse Wrede, the former commander of the United Nations forces (Ethiopian) in Abyei. The Debrecen group accuses Getachew of compromising the interests of the front, while in turn denying any connection with Eritrea. Getachew was later appointed advisor to the prime minister on East African Affairs. Debresion made statements to the “New York Times” expressing his uncertainty about the survival of the Terai region within the Ethiopian Union, which increased concern about the future of the ethnic federation established by the front under Meles Zenawi, especially in light of the boiling witnessed by the Oromia and Amhara regions. If the Pretoria agreement succeeded in stopping the war between the center and the taqray front, it made the possibility of a war between Ethiopia and Eritrea more realistic, as the agreement came contrary to the aspirations of Asmara, which was excluded from its consultations. Abiy Ahmed`s statements about the need for his country to get a sea port, saying that losing it is a "historical mistake that must be corrected," as well as the agreement he signed with Somaliland, added a new element that increased tension between Addis Ababa and Asmara, at a time when the region is already witnessing intertwined crises due to the war in Sudan and the dispute over the Renaissance Dam. Conclusion The experience of the Pretoria agreement shows that political settlements in Ethiopia remain fragile, and that the state`s ability to transform agreements into lasting stability is influenced by intertwined internal and regional factors. While the agreement ended a devastating internal war, it opened the door to new tensions with its neighbor, leaving Ethiopia facing a difficult test between rebuilding the federal state and maintaining its sensitive regional balances.