African Center for Consultancy
Introduction
In a symbolic and momentous development, France announced on July 17, 2025, the end of its permanent military presence in Senegal after more than six decades of strategic positioning in West Africa. The step came through the official handover of “Camp Gaye” and Dakar military airport facilities to the Senegalese government, in the presence of senior military officials from both sides. This event marks the culmination of a series of successive French withdrawals from the Sahel and West Africa, signaling the decline of a long era of direct French military influence and the beginning of a new chapter in relations between France and its former colonies.
- From “Camp Gaye” to the Complete Withdrawal from Senegal
The announcement ending French presence was not an abrupt decision but the result of a political move initiated by Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye Faye at the end of 2024, when he demanded the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country by 2025. In the months that followed, France began implementing a phased withdrawal plan, which included closing strategic bases in Dakar such as “Marshal,” “Saint-Exupéry,” and “Counter Admiral Protet,” culminating with the closure of “Rufisque” on July 1.
“Camp Gaye” was the last facility to be vacated, officially handed over in mid-July during a ceremony attended by General Pascal Ianni, commander of French forces in Senegal, and his Senegalese counterpart, General Mbaye Cissé.
The “French Elements in Senegal” unit, officially established in 2011, had around 350 troops. These forces were gradually redeployed during the second quarter of 2025, according to French and African press reports.
- Successive Withdrawals from the Sahel and West Africa
Senegal was only the final chapter in a broader chain of French military withdrawals across Africa in the past three years. In 2022, Paris announced the end of Operation Barkhane, its counterinsurgency campaign in Mali, following deteriorating ties with the Bamako junta. Soon after, France withdrew from Burkina Faso in February 2023, evacuating about 400 troops at the request of the transitional government.
In Niger, the July 2023 coup marked another turning point, as the new regime rejected the continued presence of about 1,500 French troops, who subsequently departed by the end of that year. Chad soon followed, announcing in late 2024 the termination of its defense cooperation agreement with Paris, leading to the complete withdrawal of French forces by January 2025.
Even Côte d’Ivoire, long regarded as one of France’s closest strategic allies, decided in early 2025 to transfer control of the “Port-Bouët” base near Abidjan, bringing to an end more than fifty years of military presence.
III. The Economic and Historical Dimensions of France’s Waning Influence
Although France still maintains economic ties and investment interests in Africa, data reveals a sharp decline in its share of African markets. Over the past two decades, France’s market share has halved, despite its exports to the continent having doubled in value. This decline is partly due to Africa’s rapid economic growth, diversification of international partnerships, and waning trust in France’s role as a traditional security and development guarantor.
The legacy of Françafrique continues to weigh heavily on France’s relations with its former colonies. For decades, Paris has been accused of exercising forms of economic and political domination through networks of influence and multinational corporations, especially in oil, telecommunications, and infrastructure sectors. Combined with its inability to provide security and stability—particularly in Mali and Niger—France’s image as a reliable partner has eroded, giving way to more critical and skeptical perceptions.
- Who Fills the Void? A New Map of Influence in Africa
As French military presence recedes in West and Central Africa, the continent’s geopolitical landscape is being rapidly redrawn. Russia has moved quickly to fill the security vacuum, forging new, unconditional contracts with transitional military regimes in Mali and Burkina Faso. These governments have relied increasingly on the Wagner Group to bolster internal security, according to reports by Anadolu Agency and Debuglies, which highlighted the growing reliance on Russian mercenaries following the breakdown of relations with Paris. This shift has sparked widespread debate among human rights organizations and media outlets, given the recurrent reports of alleged abuses and social unrest linked to Wagner’s direct involvement in security operations.
China, by contrast, has pursued a quieter, more expansive approach, focusing on strengthening its economic presence through massive infrastructure investments in roads, ports, energy, and railways, according to the Financial Times. Beijing has also consolidated its military footprint with a permanent base in Djibouti—its first official overseas military base—and analysts at ECFR suggest that China is considering expanding its military reach to other African nations.
Meanwhile, anti-French nationalist movements have gained momentum, such as Niger’s M62 Movement, which spearheaded mass protests demanding the departure of French troops after the July 2023 coup, as documented by Anadolu Agency. Similar popular uprisings occurred in Mali and Burkina Faso, where French forces were expelled under public pressure, in demonstrations framed as a symbolic liberation from “colonial legacy.”
Regionally, many African states have begun shifting away from exclusive bilateral ties with Paris in favor of more diversified security partnerships. Regional analyses—such as those published by Debuglies and ECFR—highlight that countries like Chad and Guinea are now broadening their security options by engaging with the United States, the UAE, Morocco, and Turkey. This reflects a growing desire to escape France’s traditional dominance and to establish more balanced, independent partnerships aligned with the continent’s new sovereignty-driven aspirations.
- Challenges After the French Withdrawal
One of the most pressing consequences of France’s pullout from the Sahel and West Africa is the significant security vacuum left behind, particularly in regions already plagued by fragile institutions and weak regional coordination. Field reports show that jihadist groups—especially those active in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—have exploited this vacuum to expand operations, capitalizing on the limited intelligence and military capabilities of national armies, thereby escalating attacks and undermining internal stability.
Although many governments and grassroots movements celebrate the French withdrawal as a victory for national sovereignty, this sovereignty now faces a difficult test: whether these countries can effectively secure their borders and protect citizens without direct foreign support. The political slogans linking troop departures to national liberation must now be translated into concrete actions, primarily through building resilient security institutions capable of sustainably filling the gap.
In response, Paris has been recalibrating its African strategy, moving away from the model of permanent bases and direct deployments toward a new approach centered on joint training, intelligence sharing, and strengthening local militaries without direct intervention. While this may be seen as a step toward more balanced partnerships and respect for sovereignty, it remains untested, particularly in light of the rising influence of competitors like Russia and China, who offer more flexible arrangements with fewer political conditions than traditional Western frameworks.